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Cutting-edge neuroscientific studies provide new insightsinto the inner workings of the human brain. At thesame time, innovations in justice-system data collection
have allowed researchers to gather and analyze vast quantities
of statistical data in criminal-sentencing patterns. The combi-
nation of the two genres of study provides us with the first sci-
entifically based demonstration that well-meaning egalitarian
judges may have strong neurophysiologic reactions to defen-
dants, victims, experts, and attorneys. These reactions help us
explore whether or not race affects judicial decision making.
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, caselaw, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the constitutions of every state
prohibit judges from using race as a factor in sentencing.1
However, traditional notions of race bias are based on the idea
that disparate outcomes are a simpleminded application of
racial bias perpetrated by a select few judges who are not
aligned with the values of the justice system.2 The overwhelm-
ing majority of judges are committed to fairness and impartiality.
The overwhelming majority of judges would also agree that
racial bias is abhorrent and that it has no place in our justice
system. However, the emerging neuroscience compels the
thoughtful analyst to inquire about the role of the brain’s auto-
matic reactions in decision making. 
Neuroscientists explore the brain’s processes, but the justice
system must be provided with an analysis of how the law shapes
the ways that a judge’s brain may react. The rigorous analysis
required in the application of the four principles of criminal sen-
tencing (i.e., retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapac-
itation)3 may allow or even facilitate problematic neurophysio-
logic reactions in a judge’s brain and may result in disparate sen-
tencing patterns. Yet the sentencing disparities are not explored,
and the proof that racial bias is the cause is not fully accepted.4
This is partially because the ways in which racial bias may man-
ifest in a judge’s brain are not easily understood.5
Footnotes 
1. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits bias in judicial deci-
sion making. This section of the Code is mimicked by many states
and the federal courts. Section 2.3 of the Model Code states:
Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment 
(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, includ-
ing administrative duties, without bias or prejudice. 
(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by
words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in
harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice,
or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orienta-
tion, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political
affiliation, and shall not permit court staff, court officials,
or others subject to the judge’s direction and control to
do so. 
(C) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the
court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice, or
engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including
but not limited to race, sex, gender, religion, national ori-
gin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital
status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation,
against parties, witnesses, lawyers, or others. MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 2.3 (2007).
2. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2386-2387 (2011) (not men-
tioning race but explicitly recognizing that disparities in sentencing
“imposed on similarly situated defendants” were so significant that
the Legislature enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1984) states in part:
(a) Factors to Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence.—The
court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in
paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the his-
tory and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or voca-
tional training, medical care, or other correctional treat-
ment in the most effective manner.
See also Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (stating that factors 2(A) through
(D) of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1984) are the “four considerations—ret-
ribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation— [that]
are the four purposes of sentencing generally, and a court must
fashion a sentence “to achieve the[se] purposes . . . to the extent
that they are applicable” in a given case. (citing 18 U.S.C. §
3551(a) (1984)). 
4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Even while Chief Justice Burger concludes in his dissent that the
death penalty was not cruel and unusual and that the evidence
submitted did not demonstrate sufficient racial disparities, he
clearly acknowledged that [i]f a statute that authorizes the discre-
tionary imposition of a particular penalty for a particular crime is
used primarily against defendants of a certain race, and if the pat-
tern of use can be fairly explained only by reference to the race of
the defendants, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids continued enforcement of that statute in its
existing form. Furman, 408 U.S. at 389, n. 12. 
5. Courts have recognized that implicit or unconscious racial bias
exists and that it may affect decision making in other contexts. See
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-991
(1988) (recognizing in the Title VII context that “subconscious
stereotypes and prejudice” are “a lingering form” of the discrimi-
nation and that these unconscious biases have “precisely the same
effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional dis-
crimination”).
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If a judge has a million minute, consecutive neurophysio-
logic reactions during a moment in a trial, and if some of those
minute reactions are quantitatively or qualitatively different
based on whether the defendant is African-American, Latino,
Native American, Asian-American, Pacific Islander or
Caucasian, then the ultimate outcome of the judge’s decision-
making process—the sentence itself—will likely differ as well.
Some defendants will receive more time in prison than others
for the same crime, and race will be a determinative component. 
The methodologies for these studies have advanced over
time, but they have been grounded in a reductionist approach.
To understand the reactions, researchers first sought to iden-
tify the neural substrates that activate in reaction to different
stimuli (i.e., faces, questions, images, or sounds). Next they
sought to create ever more elegant evaluations of the ways to
manipulate the stimuli to activate the very same neural sub-
strates. They wanted to know what parts of our brains activate
during different cognitive tasks, and then whether biases have
an effect on these tasks. The initial research on bias and its
origins was an attempt to understand how we think. Its prog-
eny is a quest to understand how or whether we can alter our
thought process, presumably for the good of society. 
The acceptance of the research is complicated by the fact
that the scientific nomenclature and dense calculus-laden
findings are often set outside of the realm of understanding of
those who could make the most of the conclusions—those
who are in a position to create systemic change, such as
powerbrokers in business, policymakers in the political arena,
and the decision makers within the justice system.6 However,
if judges are given access to the studies demonstrating the per-
vasive nature of these brain reactions, and the affect of each
differential step on the decision-making process, they may
begin to advocate for systemic change.7
This article treats the neurophysiologic reactions and the
ways that they interact with the four principles of criminal
sentencing in four parts. Part I shows that there are precise
areas of the brain that activate unconsciously in a racially
biased manner, and those are the same parts used to deter-
6. JERRY KANG, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS (2009), available
at http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and
%20Racial%20Fairness/kangIBprimer.ashx.
7. The Model Code Comment to Section 2.3 seems to recognize the
possibility that racially biased templates or “stereotypes” may
manifest in judicial decision making. It states in part:
[1] A judge who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding
impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judi-
ciary into disrepute. 
[2] Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include
but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nick-
names; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based
upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile
acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity,
or nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to per-
sonal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body
language can convey to parties and lawyers in the pro-
ceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of
bias or prejudice. A judge must avoid conduct that may
reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.
[Emphasis added.] MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, §
2.3, Comment (2007).
8. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 542, 548. (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (“Frankel’s cen-
tral concern was that discretionary actors such as judges and
parole officials followed no rhyme or reason beyond their own
personal instincts. Punishment decisions, more important than
much of the other routine business of the courts, were deserving
of at least a comparable degree of care.”)
9. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal
Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749 (2006). See also Joshua Dressler,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 13-18 (3d ed. 2001), for further dis-
cussion:
A deterrence-based punishment seeks to convince the
general community (and, in some formulations, the
offender himself or herself) not to commit (or repeat the
commission of) the crime for which the offender is being
sentenced. An incapacitation-based punishment relies on
confinement and supervision in order to prevent future
crimes by offenders who are believed to represent particu-
mine the basis for the appro-
priate length of incapacita-
tion in prison. Part II shows
that biological measures for
pain, empathy, and aggres-
sion may affect a judge’s abil-
ity to equitably determine
the appropriate amount of
retribution required for a
crime. Part III demonstrates
that judges may uncon-
sciously presume that more
punishment is necessary to effectively deter criminal behavior
in certain racial groups due to a judge’s failure to properly
encode those groups in the judge’s prefrontal cortex. Part IV
demonstrates that automatic associations between crime,
threat, and certain racial groups may affect a judge’s ability to
accurately assess the potential for rehabilitation. 
I. SENTENCING THEORY
In criminal courts, judges are expected to execute their
duties in a way that ensures they evenly and equally apply the
factors set forth in the law to all defendants, regardless of
race. They are further expected to remove inappropriate
biases from their decision-making process so that the biases
will not influence those decisions. However, it is precisely the
inquiry required by the principles of sentencing that calls upon
judges to activate the parts of their neuro-anatomy that use
biases.8
When sentencing in criminal court, a judge is required to
apply a wide range of factors to determine the appropriate
length of the sentence. While there is much diversity between
the criminal sentencing laws from state to state, and between
state sentencing laws and federal sentencing laws, the four
basic purposes for punishment in criminal sentencing appear
to be universal.
Historically, retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and inca-
pacitation have been the four corners of sentencing law.9 Over
[I]f judges are given
access to studies
demonstrating . . .
these brain 
reactions, . . . they
may begin to 
advocate for 
systemic change.
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larly important recidivism threats. A rehabilitative sen-
tence will involve some form of therapy, treatment, or
training to help address the underlying causes of criminal
behavior. Just deserts, a form of retributive punishment, is
often contrasted with the foregoing utilitarian purposes of
punishment; desert does not seek future crime prevention
per se, but rather demands punishment as a moral imper-
ative in its own right, often seen as necessary to affirm the
status of victims or show respect for the personhood of
defendants.
10. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386-87. Tapia doesn’t mention race but
explicitly recognizes that disparities in sentencing were so signif-
icant that the legislature enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984. It further recognizes that Congress was also motivated to
pass the Act based on the belief that that rehabilitation was not
possible in most cases:
“For almost a century, the Federal Government
employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sen-
tencing.” [quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361,
363.] . . .  But this model of indeterminate sentencing even-
tually fell into disfavor. One concern was that it produced
“[s]erious disparities in [the] sentences imposed on simi-
larly situated defendants [citation omitted].” Tapia, 131 S.
Ct. at 2368-87.
11. Sergi G. Costafreda, Michael J. Brammer, Anthony S. David, &
Cynthia H.Y. Fu, Predictors of Amygdala Activation During the
Processing of Emotional Stimuli: A Meta-Analysis of 385 PET and
fMRI Studies, 58 BRAIN RES. REV. 57 (2008); Frank Van Overwalle,
Social Cognition and the Brain: A Meta-Analysis, 30 HUM. BRAIN
MAPPING 829 (2009).
12. Additionally fear becomes a learned response on a molecular level:
It is generally believed that long-term retention of the
effects of learning involve intracellular cascades that are
triggered by the influx of calcium during postsynaptic
depolarization [citations omitted]. The rise in calcium then
triggers several kinases and transcription factors . . . .
These act, possibly in concert, to induce genes and initiate
synthesis of new proteins. Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional
Brain, Fear, and the Amygdala, 23 CELLULAR & MOLECULAR
NEUROBIOLOGY 727, 731 (2003). 
13. David M. Amodio, Eddie Harmon-Jones, Patricia G. Devine, John
J. Curtin, Sigan L. Hartley, & Alison E. Covert, Neural Signals for
the Detection of Unintentional Race Bias, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 88
(2004).
14. Elizabeth A. Phelps, Kevin J. O’Connor, William A. Cunningham,
E. Sumie Funayma, J. Christopher Gatenby, John C. Gore, &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Performance on Indirect Measures of Race
Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activity, 12 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 729 (2000). 
the years, the popularity of
each principle has waxed and
waned. While one emerges as
the vogue until its time in
favor dissipates, another is
declared repugnant by factions
of society. At times, concurrent
warring views may be held by
influential groups. For exam-
ple, in the early 1970s and
1980s, the Model Penal Code
emphasized retribution in sen-
tencing; however, more recent
amendments to the code have placed greater emphasis on reha-
bilitation as a goal. Conversely, in 1984, federal lawmakers
rewrote the penal code to reflect their conclusion that rehabili-
tation was no longer a realistic goal.10
The four principles of sentencing law are based in large
part on determination of the choices available to the actor, the
motivation to act, and the level of injury suffered by the vic-
tim. Early classical theorists provided insight into the process
of rational choice. It is assumed that each actor is concerned
with his own suffering, which is a potential penalty for engag-
ing in a criminal act, and that this concern prevents many
people from engaging in criminal behavior. It is further
assumed that many people choose not to engage in criminal
behavior because it is not in alignment with their value sys-
tem. Determining how to apply the four purposes for punish-
ment is based in part on a judge’s conclusions about a con-
victed individual’s inherent dangerousness or proclivity for
engaging in criminal behavior, the judge’s sympathetic
response to the victim and the defendant, and the judge’s
belief in the ability of the defendant to change his behavior. 
INCAPACITATION
Incapacitation, or removing an individual from society and
from his capacity to continue to engage in criminal behavior,
is necessary for longer periods of time if the convicted person
is more dangerous. A judge must increase the length of sen-
tences for those who cannot change and who pose a signifi-
cant threat. Thus the analysis for determining the need for
incapacitation requires the judge to assess the perceived level
of threat. However, the neurophysiologic and cognitive
process of threat assessment is perhaps the most compelling
demonstration of bias available in the scientific literature
today. 
Validated studies have consistently shown that specific
areas of the amygdalae, small subcortical nodes in the brain,
activate when subjects feel fear, threat, anxiety, and distrust.11
The progeny of these studies has explored the various stimuli
that activate this region and the layers of subtleties that
demonstrate the complexities of the reactions.12 Individuals
with diagnosed phobias, specifically arachnophobia (fear of
spiders) and ophidiophobia (fear of snakes), demonstrate a
significantly higher level of amygdala activation when they
view pictures of spiders and snakes in comparison to when
they view pictures of other predatory, threatening, or fero-
cious creatures, such as tigers.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies
have shown there is increased neural responsitivity in the
amygdalae to African-American faces.13 One of the pioneering
studies in this area showed a measurable increase in left-supe-
rior amygdala activation when subjects viewed African-
American male faces verses Caucasian male faces.14 All of the
study participants were Caucasian. 
However, to ensure a thorough analysis of the intersection
between neuroscience, cognition, and criminal sentencing, we









bias available . . . .
15. Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice:
Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation,
16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56 (2005). Caucasian subjects viewed African-
American and Caucasian faces and showed increased amygdala
activation for the Caucasian faces, particularly when required to
categorize the pictures based on the age of the person pictured. 
16. The study’s authors noted that while the differential activation was
unimpressive, the level of amygdala activation correlated with the
level of unconscious or implicit racial bias shown on a well-
known psychological test called the Implicit Association Test
(IAT). The IAT is a computerized test that is validated with an
overwhelmingly statistically significant sample. People have com-
pleted over 4.5 million IAT’s online and had their data recorded by
Project Implicit, the center that administers the IAT website.
Project Implicit, General Information, http://www.projectimp
licit.net/generalinfo.php.
The IAT measures mistakes made in matching words to specific
categories, and it measures, in milliseconds, the time that it takes
the subject to make these matches. The amount of delay and the
number of mistakes are assessed, and the result demonstrates the
strength of the implicit association between the words and the cat-
egories. The Race IAT (also known as the Black/White IAT) has
four segments, and in one of the segments, it presents two cate-
gories: 1) “black and good”; and 2) “white and bad.” Damian
Stanley, Elizabeth A. Phelps, & Mahzarin Banaji, The Neural Basis
of Implicit Attitudes, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 164
(2008). The subject is asked to match words to each category that
relates to bad (i.e., agony, horrible, etc.) and words that relate to
good (i.e., joy, happy, etc.), as well as photographs of faces of
African-American and Caucasian people. In a separate segment,
the subjects are required to match the same words (i.e., agony,
horrible, joy, happy, etc.) and the same photographs of black and
white faces to new compound categories: 1) “black and bad”; and
2) “white and good.”
The level of amygdala activation in the study correlated directly
with the level of bias demonstrated on the Race IAT. The study par-
ticipants whose fMRI’s showed greater amygdala activation when
viewing the African-American male faces had correspondingly
greater difficulty, slower response time, and more errors when they
tried to match the words and pictures with the compound cate-
gories “black and good” and “white and bad” than when they had
the categories “white and good” and “black and bad.” Jennifer A.
Richeson, Abigail A. Baird, Heather L. Gordon, Todd F. Heatherton,
Carrie L. Wyland, Sophie Trawalter, & J. Nicole Shelton, An fMRI
Examination of the Impact of Interracial Contact on Executive
Function, 6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1323 (2003) (This examination
shows that as implicit racial bias increases and garners resources to
fit the level of amygdala and insula reaction, other cognitive skills
such as executive functioning are substantially impaired. An fMRI
study measured impairment to executive functioning in the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) when Caucasians interacted with
African-Americans). 
17. Brian A. Nosek et. al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit
Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36 (2007). 
18. Jaclyn Ronquillo et al., The Effects of Skin Tone on Race-related
Amygdala Activity: An fMRI Investigation, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE &
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 39 (2007).
19. Multiple studies demonstrate that people apply racial stereotypes
to African-Americans who have stronger Afrocentric facial fea-
tures than to African-Americans who are have weaker Afrocentric
facial features. Keith B. Maddox, 8 Perspectives on Racial
Phenotypicality Bias, PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 383
(2004); Keith B. Maddox & Stephanie Gray Chase, Manipulating
Subcategory Salience: Exploring the Link between Skin Tone and
Social Perception of Blacks, 34 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 533 (2004).
must continue the inquiry to include the subtleties of the
study. The study included much more revealing correlations.15
The study also used the “startle blink reaction,” which
measures the reactions of the muscles around the eyes when
the subject is presented with certain stimuli. The startle-blink
reaction is a measurable indication of fear. The reaction is very
difficult to control or hide, and often the strength with which
the subject blinks or the number of times the subject blinks
when presented with certain visual stimuli is unknown to the
subject himself. Researchers found a direct correlation
between the level of amygdala activation and the startle-blink
reaction when subjects were presented with pictures of
African-American and Caucasian male faces.16 The subjects
who had increased left-superior amygdala activation when
viewing African-American faces demonstrated a correspond-
ingly greater startle blink reaction when viewing African-
American faces.
The study also collected explicit measures of bias (i.e., bias
that the subjects are conscious of or willing to admit to them-
selves or others). Explicit measures required the subject to
state whether or not they held racial preferences and to what
degree. The explicit reports demonstrated that when it comes
to race, people rated themselves as only marginally biased or
not biased at all against African-Americans.17 Notably, the
explicit measures or admissions of bias did not correlate with





The affect of race on the
brain is potentiated by the
level of “typically” African
or “typically” Caucasian
facial features. The more
African a person’s face
appears, the higher the level
of fear; and the more
Caucasian a person’s face
appears, the lower the level of fear. Research revealed that
there was increased amygdala activation in subjects who
viewed faces with more pronounced Afrocentric facial fea-
tures.18 A series of photographs of both African-American and
Caucasian faces were presented to subjects. One photograph
was an African-American male face with strong Afrocentric
features (full lips, broad nose, dark skin, and curly hair). One
photograph was a picture of an African-American male with
more Eurocentric features. Another photo was of a Caucasian
male with more Afrocentric features. And the final photo-
graph was of a Caucasian person with more Eurocentric fea-
tures. The amygdala activation was highest for the African-
American male face with the Afrocentric features.19 The next










20. Y. Moriguchi, T. Ohnishi, T. Kawachi et al., Specific Brain
Activation in Japanese and Caucasian People to Fearful Faces, 16
NEUROREPORT 133 (2005).
21. Matthew D. Lieberman, Ahmad Hariri, Johanna M. Jarcho, Naomi
I. Eisenberger, & Susan Y. Bookheimer, An fMRI Investigation of
Race-Related Amygdala Activity in African-American and Caucasian-
American Individuals, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 720 (2005).
22. P. Wright, G. He, N. A. Shapira, W. K. Goodman, & Y. Liu, Disgust
and the Insula: fMRI Responses to Pictures of Mutilation and
Contamination, 15 NEUROREPORT 2347 (2004).
23. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991).
24. Jennifer A. Richeson & Sophie Trawalter, Why Do Interracial
Interactions Impair Executive Function? A Resource Depletion
Account, 88 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 934 (2005);
Jennifer A. Richeson, Sophie Trawalter, & J. Nicole Shelton,
African-Americans’ Racial Attitudes and the Depletion of Executive
Function after Interracial Interactions, 23 SOCIAL COGNITION 336
(2005).
25. While it may be argued that in-group preference can be shown by
any racial group, it must be noted that the majority of judges in the
U.S. are Caucasian. Carl Tobias, Commentary: Diversity and the
Federal Bench, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1195 (2010). In many state courts,
over 90% of the judges are Caucasian. With few exceptions, the
overwhelming majority of state supreme courts are all Caucasian.
26. Irene V. Blair, Charles M. Judd, & Kristine M. Chapleau, The
Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 15
PSYCHOL. SCI. 674 (2004); Irene V. Blair, Charles M. Judd, & Jennifer
L. Fallman, The Automaticity of Race and Afrocentric Facial Features
in Social Judgments, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 763 (2004).
highest level of amygdala activa-
tion occurred with the African-
American face that had more
Eurocentric features. The subjects
also showed amygdala activation
for the Caucasian face with
Afrocentric features (though not
as strong as the reaction to the
African-American faces).20
INSULA ACTIVATION
In addition to stronger amygdala activation for African-
American faces, studies also demonstrate a stronger insula
reaction among some Caucasian people for African-American
faces.21 The insula has been typically associated with aversion,
revulsion, or disgust; for example, it is the part of the brain
that activates when we smell rotting garbage.22 In the study,
the subjects viewed faces of African-Americans and
Caucasians while undergoing fMRI scans. The insula reaction
was significant when the subjects saw the faces of individuals
from a different race. 
Notably, criminal-law scholars and economists have cited
revulsion as a component of the motivation for incapacita-
tion.23 Someone whose crime is repulsive to a judge will be a
prime candidate for removal from society, and for longer peri-
ods of time. If a defendant’s appearance or identity creates an
aversion or repulsion response, this may enhance the adverse
response to the crime. The prospect of sending someone back
into society who creates the same reaction in a judge as the
smell of rotten garbage is likely to be avoided. If the revulsion
reaction is potentiated by race, the African-American defen-
dant may receive a longer term in prison based on this imper-
missible factor. Unfortunately, the process of analyzing the
need for incapacitation may include deciding whether or not
a defendant can be returned to society or whether they are
associated with the emotion of aversion and cannot re-join
society for an extended period of time. The analysis requires
the judge to tap into the revulsion response to make this
assessment, and the revulsion response may be biased by race. 
DIMINISHED PREFRONTAL-CORTEX EXECUTIVE
FUNCTIONING 
In addition to the increased amygdala activation as a result
of racial bias, resources needed for other brain functions will
be depleted. As bias increases, garnering resources to fit the
level of amygdala and insula reaction, other cognitive skills
such as executive functioning are substantially impaired. An
fMRI study measured impairment to executive functioning in
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) when Caucasians
interacted with African-Americans.24
In the study, some of the participants interacted with an
African-American (possibly to create an amygdala and insula
reaction in the brain) and some interacted with a Caucasian
person. The participants were then required to perform a task
that should have recruited their executive functioning—a
cognitive color-matching test called the Stroop Test. The par-
ticipants who interacted with the African-American person
before attempting to complete the color-matching test were
slower and less accurate when completing the test. Moreover,
those who interacted with the African-American person
before they attempted the color-matching test showed dimin-
ished activation in their dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
In this context, if executive functioning is diminished due
to neurophysiologic reactions to African-Americans, then the
decision maker will be less able to access the proper rules to
apply to the sentencing decision but will simply apply default
rules (such as implicit associations equating “Black” with
“bad”) to the decision instead. 
Aversion and disgust, when combined with fear, threat, dis-
trust, and diminished executive functioning, create a formida-
ble combination for the African-American defendant to over-
come.25 A judge’s determination of the level of threat a defen-
dant poses and whether the defendant should be separated
from others in society is not simply permissible, it is required
in the incapacitation analysis. However, in assessing these fac-
tors, the judge may include the reaction of fear, threat, and
aversion. The neurophysiologic reaction to the African-
American male, particularly the African-American male with
strong Afrocentric facial features, is worthy of further discus-
sion. The potential connection to resulting disparities in crim-
inal sentencing is stark.
AFROCENTRIC FACIAL FEATURES AND CRIMINAL
SENTENCING 
Afrocentric facial features have an impact on the length and
type of sentences given to inmates.26 A Stanford University






disgust . . . .
27. David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil
Alan Weiner, & Barbara Broffitt, Racial Discrimination and the
Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal
Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL LAW
REVIEW 1638 (1998) (showing that African-American defendants
receive the death penalty more frequently than their Caucasian
counterparts). 
28. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns,
& Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived
Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing
Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006).
29. ASHLEY NELLIS, JUDITH GREENE, & MARC MAUER, REDUCING RACIAL
DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR
PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS (2008), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingra
cialdisparity.pdf. 
30. Id. at 8, citing WILLIAM J. SABOL, HEATHER COUTURE, & PAIGE M.
HARRISON, PRISONERS IN 2006 (2007), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p06.pdf.
31. Lauren E. Glaze & Thomas P. Bonczar, Probation and Parole in the
United States (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/ppus07st.pdf.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (1984) specifically calls for the judge to
consider the characteristics of the defendant as well as the crimi-
nal history:
(a) Factors to Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence.—The
court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in
paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant . . . .”
[Emphasis added.] 
33. To determine the severity of past convictions, offenders receive a
designated number of criminal-history points for every prior sen-
tence of imprisonment exceeding 1 year and 1 month. The
researchers also quantified criminal history by adding points based
on whether the offense was committed while the offender was
under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole,
supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.
study demonstrated that facial features of African-American
male defendants correlate to imposition of the death penalty.27
The study showed that as the faces of the defendants depicted
higher levels of Afrocentric facial features, the defendants
were more likely to receive the death penalty. Using mug shots
of faces of men convicted of crimes for which the death
penalty could be imposed, the researchers coded the faces for
Afrocentric features. Those individuals with more Afrocentric
facial features were more likely to receive the death penalty
when controlling for numerous other factors.28 The level of
Afrocentric facial features potentiated the desire of the jury to
impose the death penalty. This result aligns with the fMRI
studies showing increased amygdala and insula activation for
African-Americans.
DISPARITIES IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING AND THE
NEUROSCIENTIFIC CORRELATES
Nationwide, African-Americans constitute 38% of the jail
and prison population, but they constitute only 13% of the
United States population.29 In response to such statistics,
many immediately advance the rationale that African-
Americans simply commit more crimes and, therefore, they
are overrepresented in the prison population. However, a
more thorough analysis of the statistics demonstrates a dis-
turbing disparity not explained by alleged increased crime
rates. According the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, in 2006, African-Americans made up only 14% of
illegal-drug users, in parity with their 13% representation in
the U.S. population. Yet they are overrepresented in the sub-
sequent steps in the criminal justice pipeline. African-
Americans represent 35% of arrests for drug offenses, 53% of
convictions for drug offenses, and 45% of those incarcerated
for drug offenses.30 Additionally, the more lenient sentencing
option of probation is given more freely to Caucasian offend-
ers. In 2006, 56% of those on probation were Caucasian,
while only 29% were African-American.31
FEDERAL SENTENCING
STUDY
In a study of sentencing pat-
terns nationwide, researchers
compiled data from 77,256
defendants sentenced in fed-
eral courts under the United
States Sentencing Commission
Guidelines. The researchers
conducted a regression analy-
sis, which controlled for multiple factors that should affect the
length of sentences, including crime seriousness or offense
level and criminal history.32
Offense level was determined by the severity of the offense.
The offense was assigned a base value that correlated to the
offense level identified in the code. This base value was then
increased or decreased based on other characteristics of the
offense (i.e., whether the offense resulted in a substantial like-
lihood of death or serious bodily injury; the monetary amount
gained by the offender; whether the victim was a minor;
whether the crime was committed with a gun, etc.). The study
also controlled for criminal history, including the severity and
number of past offenses and whether the offense was commit-
ted while on probation or parole, etc.33
While all of these factors affected sentencing, there was
still a disparity in the sentences handed down, and race was
the determinative factor. African-Americans received 5.5
more months in prison than their Caucasian counterparts for
the same crimes, with the same criminal history and the same
aggravating and mitigating factors. Latinos received 4.5
months in jail more than Caucasians who were charged with
the same crime. A combined group of Asians, Pacific
Islanders, Native Americans, and those of mixed heritage was
included in the analysis as well. This group received 2.3
months more in prison than their Caucasian counterparts.
These disparities remained significant even when the
researchers controlled for income, education level, citizen-
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injury is most clearly seen on the face of the law in the civil con-
text in the doctrine of unclean hands. 
ship, age, language status,
etc. After these adjustments
for socioeconomic factors,
African-American defen-
dants received 4.5 months
more in prison than
Caucasians for the same
crime; Latino defendants
received 2.5 more months
in jail; and the aggregate
group of Asian-Americans,
Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans still received 2.3
more months in federal prison. 
The additional time in prison for being African-American is
equivalent to the additional time provided for a prior felony con-
viction. Thus, in this context, being African-American was equiv-
alent to committing an additional crime. 
AFROCENTRIC FACIAL FEATURES AND THE
AMYGDALA
The most telling correlation between amygdala studies and
statistical data can be found with Afrocentric facial features.
Amygdala activation increases as the level of Afrocentric facial
features of the person being viewed increases. A recent study
found that sentence length also increases as Afrocentric facial
features increase. Researchers studied Afrocentric facial fea-
tures across racial lines. Using mug shots, faces of African-
American men and Caucasian men who had been convicted of
felonies in Florida were coded for Afrocentric features on a
scale of 1 to 9, 9 being the highest and 1 being the lowest. The
researchers then reviewed the case files and controlled for 11
separate factors that may also affect the length of the sentence,
such as seriousness of the primary offense, number of addi-
tional concurrent offenses, seriousness of additional concur-
rent offenses, number of prior offenses, and seriousness of
prior offenses.
The researchers found that African-American inmates
with more Afrocentric features received longer sentences.
Inmates who were one standard deviation greater than the
norm for Afrocentric features received 7 to 8 months more in
jail than inmates who were 1 standard deviation below, con-
trolling for the 11 other factors. The stronger facial features
accounted for a 2% increase in sentence length. While this
may seem minor, it should be noted that having an addi-
tional concurrent serious offense charged increased the sen-
tence length by 3%. In other words, having a broader nose,
darker skin, fuller lips, and curlier hair was almost equivalent
to being saddled with an additional serious criminal charge. It
was as if the Florida Penal Code listed looking African-
American as a crime as serious as aggravated assault or pos-
session with intent to sell. 
Surprisingly, Caucasian inmates with Afrocentric features
also received longer sentences than their Caucasian counter-
parts with more Eurocentric features. Once again, inmates
who were one standard deviation greater than the norm for
Afrocentric features received 7 to 8 months more in jail than
inmates who were 1 standard deviation below, controlling for
seriousness of crime, prior convictions, additional crimes
charged, and several other factors. 
We need not stop the inquiry here, however. The four prin-
ciples that underlie the sentencing process go beyond the sim-
ple detection of threat or aversion.34 Retribution includes the
assessment of appropriate levels of counter-injury. 
II. RETRIBUTION 
Retribution in sentencing theory is based on the conclu-
sion that a crime “demands punishment as a moral imperative
in its own right.”35 As with the other factors in sentencing,
retribution includes a consideration of the impression left by
a defendant on the mind of a judge (i.e., culpability and
intent).36 However, retribution also requires the judge to con-
sider the victim. The judge must consider the level of pain or
injury suffered by the victim along with the victim’s value or
status, affording the victim the right to have a counterbalanc-
ing punishment for a defendant that fits the crime.37 Indeed,
the calculation surrounding what charges to bring and what
chances a case has in front of a jury includes, at its core,
whether or not there is a sympathetic victim that the jury will
relate to and want to vindicate. 
Empathy is an outgrowth of an individual’s ability to
relate to the victim—to find a connection with the victim’s
identity and plight so that the individual can imagine the
pain of the victim as his or her own pain. For retribution, the
analysis of the level of the injury and the empathy and value
for the victim are inextricably intertwined. The law explic-
itly and reasonably increases penalties for the same injury
suffered by someone who is helpless (e.g., a child or an
elderly person) verses someone who is capable of defending
themselves. Likewise, retribution may be unconsciously and
impermissibly increased for the same injury suffered by
someone for whom a judge feels more empathy versus some-
one for whom the judge feels very little or no empathy.
Additionally, there is the ever-present “how dare you” factor.
This embodies the notion that as an individual empathizes
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with the pain of a victim, he is offended that anyone would
hurt a person for whom he can feel such empathy. A judge
may place greater value on a victim if the judge relates to the
victim and if the judge more poignantly feels the victim’s
pain. The value or status of the victim is, therefore, also a
part of the calculation for retribution.38 Thus, for the pur-
poses of retribution, culpability is potentiated by the empa-
thy felt for the victim.39
Another factor that modulates the level of retribution
downward is the level of pain and sympathy felt for the
Caucasian defendant. A prison sentence will inflict pain on
the defendant. If a judge has an empathetic pain response for
a defendant then he will be less motivated and less likely to
impose a higher level of punishment and pain in the form of
a prison sentence. 
As a judge determines the appropriate level of retribution,
he is required to assess the culpability and the level of empa-
thy that should be applied towards both the victim and defen-
dant. However, this assessment, like the threat assessment for
incapacitation, is inextricably and disturbingly intertwined
with neurophysiologic reactions and bias. 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF PAIN EMPATHY 
A study demonstrates that pain empathy may be affected by
race. In the study, participants were monitored for physiologic
reactions as they were shown videos of three different hands
being stuck by a hypodermic needle. In a randomized order,
participants watched a Caucasian hand, an African-American
hand, and a purple hand being stuck by a hypodermic needle.
Pain empathy is measured by the level of sensory motor con-
tagion and corticol spinal inhibition. If an individual
empathizes with another person’s pain, that individual will
have a physiologic reaction that is akin to actually suffering
the physical injury. When an injury occurs in the body, the
brain attempts to dampen down the level of pain felt. The
brain achieves this by lessening or inhibiting the level of sen-
sation felt in the injured area—this is called cortical spinal
inhibition. When someone watches another person being
injured and he feels empathy for the pain, he also feels corti-
cal spinal inhibition. It is as if the pain experience is “conta-
gious.” This phenomenon is called sensory motor contagion.
Therefore, if, as a person observes another person receiving a
painful hand injury, the observer has an increased level of cor-
tical spinal inhibition in his own hand, then scientists con-
clude the observer empathizes with the pain of the injured
person. Conversely, if the observer does not feel empathy for
the pain he witnesses, then his brain will not initiate cortical
spinal inhibition because there is no risk of sensory motor
contagion. The brain does not need to dampen down the
empathetic sensation if the observer is not having an empa-
thetic response. 
In the study, the Caucasian subjects experienced high lev-
els of cortical spinal inhibition and sensory motor contagion
when they watched the
Caucasian hand being stuck
with the hypodermic nee-
dle.40 When the Caucasian
subjects saw the purple hand
being stuck, they demon-
strated a measurable but low
level of pain empathy.
However, as the Caucasian
subjects saw the African-
American hand being stuck
in the same painful manner, there was an opposite reaction to
cortical spinal inhibition. There was an absence of empathy.
Notably, the level of pain empathy felt correlated with the
level of unconscious or implicit racial bias as shown on the
Race IAT. The higher the level of implicit racial bias against
African-Americans on the IAT, the lower the amount of empa-
thy for the pain of the black person. Since 74% to 87.1% of the
Caucasian population in America shows implicit bias against
African-Americans on the Race IAT, it is possible that a signif-
icant percentage of the population may show a differential
level of pain empathy toward people of African descent and a
higher level of pain empathy toward Caucasians. Additionally,
since the Race IAT scores among Caucasian judges are in
alignment with the level of IAT results for the general popula-
tion, it can be reasonably concluded that similar conclusions
can be drawn for some judges. 
Additionally, African-American subjects felt greater empa-
thy for the black hand and less empathy for the Caucasian
hand. However, since the level of empathy correlates with
Race IAT scores and African-Americans’ IAT results in large
samples demonstrate that one third of African-Americans
show bias in favor of Caucasians, one third show no bias
toward either racial group, and only one third show bias
against Caucasians, the possibility of differential pain empa-
thy is reduced. Additionally, since African-American judges
show a higher level of implicit preference for Caucasians than
the general African-American population, the possibility that
African-American judges may feel less pain empathy for
Caucasian victims is further significantly diminished. 
If a judge feels greater pain empathy for Caucasian defen-
dants, he may not provide those defendants with long prison
sentences. As the judge sends the defendant to prison, he
may unconsciously imagine the harm occurring to himself.
This differential and racially biased empathetic reaction may
account for both the lower sentences and the downward
departures from the federal sentencing guidelines for
Caucasian defendants. Additionally, if a judge feels greater
empathy for the pain of the victim, then any cases with
Caucasian victims may result in higher sentences. The syn-
ergy between these two aspects of pain sympathy may
explain why African-American defendants who are con-
victed of killing Caucasian victims are most frequently given
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behavior will harm the target, and that the target is motivated
to avoid the behavior. Actual harm is not required. [Citing
ROBERT A. BARON, DEBORAH R. RICHARDSON, HUMAN AGGRESSION
(2d ed. 2004); RUSSELL G. GEEN, HUMAN AGGRESSION (2d ed.
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477 (2001).] 
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45. See Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Hanna Damasio & Antonio R.
Damasio, Fear and the Human Amygdala, 75 J.  NEUROSCIENCE 5879
(1995), stating: 
Studies of the amygdala in humans have come largely from
two sources: surgical lesions and electrical stimulation.
Although surgical lesions of the human amygdala suffer from
the drawback that they may be incomplete, and that the sub-
jects may not be normal prior to the surgery [citations omit-
ted], a review of these cases [citation omitted] strongly sup-
ports the role of the amygdala in processing fear and aggres-
sion and in social behavior. 






the penalty to be provided
will cause pain or injury to
the defendant. In fact,
some penal codes state
that the purpose of sentencing is no longer rehabilitation but
punishment.42 Whether retribution is a primary or secondary
consideration, retribution analysis requires a judge to deter-
mine how much pain or injury to cause. 
The process whereby one person intentionally causes
another person pain, even if that pain is justified, is aggres-
sion. The lay definition of aggression has both negative and
positive connotations. However, the psychological and bio-
logical definition of aggression is limited to wanting or pur-
posely acting to cause pain or injury to another.43 All human
aggression is not physical aggression. Injury or harm caused
intentionally is aggression, even when that hurt or harm is
simply demeaning another person, causing them psychologi-
cal distress, or incarcerating them. 
While painted in well-meaning nomenclature designed to
increase society’s comfort level with the task of placing another
human being in jail, the process of incarceration can be an out-
growth of aggression. The application of retribution can be
based on revenge or retaliation. The principle’s relationship to
revenge or retaliation is so basic in the law that it can be found
in the popular hornbook, Criminal Law, which states:
Retribution: This is the oldest theory of punishment,
and the one which still commands considerable respect
from the general public. By this theory, also called
revenge or retaliation, punishment (the infliction of suf-
fering) is imposed by society on criminals in order to
obtain revenge, or perhaps (under the less emotional
concept of retribution) because it is only fitting and just
that one who has caused harm to others should himself
suffer for it. [Emphasis added.]44
At first blush, it may offend the sensibilities of judges to
claim that application of retribution is tied to aggression. The
judicial canons look down upon displays of some forms of
aggression from individual judges, but those displays are ones
that demonstrate malice or overt self-satisfaction with causing
pain to a defendant. Such aggression is distasteful and not
publicly sanctioned. However, human aggression can be chan-
neled through sanctioned processes. It can be aligned with
governmental purposes. It can even be mandated by law. Legal
scholars and the United States Supreme Court have recog-
nized the purpose of punishment as related to government-
sanctioned aggression. 
The amygdala is intimately involved in aggression.45 The
amygdala initiates aggressive behavior in human and other
mammals, and its involvement in aggression is linked to the
racial-bias studies involving the amygdala. Higher levels of
amygdala activation for African-American faces will likely
result in higher levels of aggression. However, the level of acti-
vation is only one aspect of the amygdala reaction. The length
of the neuropathway is also implicated in aggression for the
amygdala. 
The amygdala may be activated by a series of preceding
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steps. The longer path to the amygdala begins at the thalamus,
proceeds through the sensory cortex, and then reaches the
amygdala. The sensory cortex “weeds out” extraneous or
inappropriate considerations and recognizes subtleties before
the amygdala is activated. For instance, a face that is not smil-
ing may be seen as angry or simply unhappy. If the observer is
able to maximize the number of steps before initiating aggres-
sion, he will consider the possibility that the person is not
smiling because the person is on trial for a crime, and is there-
fore scared and possibly depressed. 
However, when a person has a predisposition to find cer-
tain faces to be threatening or to conclude that certain indi-
viduals should invoke aggression, the brain will take a neu-
ropathway “shortcut.” The thalamus will activate and then the
amygdala will activate, skipping the sensory cortex.46 Thus,
fewer extraneous components will be weeded out of the deci-
sion-making process and more subtleties will be missed. A
person who is not smiling may be seen, unconsciously, as
angry or hostile instead of scared and sad. This neuro-short-
cut increases the likelihood that otherwise non-threatening
faces will be seen as threatening and will initiate a higher level
of aggression. 
Increased hostility and increased aggression have been
shown in studies utilizing race as a factor. A recent study
demonstrates that African-Americans, independent of cir-
cumstances, engender hostility in individuals from other
groups. In an experiment conducted at New York University,
participants were required to engage in the boring task of
counting circles flashed in a computer screen.47 They were to
record whether or not an odd or even number of circles
appeared on the screen, and after they counted the number of
circles and recorded the answer, yet another picture of circles
would appear on the screen for them to count and record. As
they proceeded with the task, pictures were flashed sublimi-
nally on the computer screen. For some of the participants, a
picture of a young African-American man was flashed sub-
liminally; and for another, a picture of a young Caucasian
man was flashed. After the participants counted the circles on
130 consecutive slides flashed in the screen, the computer
crashed. The participants were told that all of the data had
been lost and they would be required to begin the exercise
again. 
The researchers then meticulously measured the level of
hostility demonstrated by each group after the computer
crashed. Three individuals, including 2 who were blind to
condition, used a unipolar scale of hostility ranging from 0 to
10 to rate the participants. All of the individuals who rated
the participants consistently concluded that those who saw
the subliminal African-American male pictures during the
counting task were more hostile than those who saw the
Caucasian male pictures.
Increased hostility toward
an individual defendant, not
engendered by the evidence,
creates an additional barrier
to fair treatment under the
law. It could inspire a judge
to unknowingly impose
more severe retribution for a
criminal act. It may also
decrease a judge’s willingness
to exercise his discretion to
ensure due process, such as
allowing for certain wit-
nesses, providing sufficient
latitude during questioning, and sustaining or denying
motions in limine so that certain evidence is admitted or
excluded. 
IV. REHABILITATION 
While retribution requires assessment of culpability, the
analysis for rehabilitation requires a determination of
whether the convicted criminal’s character is resilient enough
that he can refrain from committing crimes in the future.
Rehabilitation can be viewed as increasing a prison sentence
under the guise that the time in prison causes a convicted
criminal to change and improve behavior. This theory has
been roundly rejected by legislatures and many judges.
Conversely, rehabilitation can be viewed as the rationale for
imposing probation, counseling, anger management, educa-
tional, and job-skill programs—correspondingly reducing the
length of time in prison.48 Under either view of retribution, if
a defendant is seen as less amenable to change, he will receive
more time in prison. Individuals who are seen as pathologi-
cal or who have the proclivity to commit crimes will be seen
as less able to respond to rehabilitative efforts. If the criminal
is seen as having an endemic criminal nature, then he cannot
be rehabilitated. Just as in the analysis for incapacitation,
rehabilitation is also linked to dangerousness and potential
threat. Those who are inherently more dangerous and pose a
greater potential threat are less likely to respond to rehabili-
tation efforts. 
AFRICAN-AMERICANS, NEGATIVE CONCEPTS, AND
CRIME
Researchers have attempted to determine whether there is
an implicit association between African-Americans and
crime, and to determine if African-Americans are seen as hav-
ing an endemic criminal nature. In a study conducted at
Stanford University, researchers first primed the participants
with either a picture of an African-American male or a
Caucasian male (a third control group received no priming
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images).49 After the partici-
pants were primed, they were
shown degraded images of
various objects. Some of the
objects were crime related:
guns, knives, and handcuffs.
Other objects were not crime
related, such as a suitcase and
a piece of fruit. Each image
was initially shown in a blurry
state—so blurry that the
object could not be identified.
But with each advancing frame, the image on the screen
became increasingly clear. 
However, there was a significant difference in how quickly
participants could identify the crime-related objects based
upon the priming mechanism used. Participants primed with
the African-American face were able to correctly identify the
crime-related objects more quickly than the non-crime-related
objects. Crime-related objects were identified on average by
the 18th frame when subjects were primed with the African-
American face (non-crime-related objects were identified at
approximately the 23rd frame). It would be reasonable to
assume that the subjects primed with the Caucasian face
would identify the crime-related and non-crime-related
objects in the same way as the subjects primed with the
African-American face. However, the subjects identified the
non-crime-related objects at almost the same frame (24th) on
average (compared to 23rd for the non-crime related objects)
as the subjects who were not primed and the subjects who
were primed with the African-American face. However, sub-
jects primed with the Caucasian face were not able to identify
the crime-related object until approximately the 27th frame,
almost 10 frames later than the group primed with the
African-American face and 4 frames later than the participants
who were not primed with any pictures. The Caucasian face
actually diminished the subjects’ ability to identify the crime-
related objects. Notably, participants who were not primed
with any faces identified both the crime-related and non-
crime-related objects at approximately the 23rd frame. 
Surprisingly, this result demonstrated two important con-
cerns. First, the participants needed far less information to
conclude that crime was at issue when they were thinking
about African-American males. Second, the participants
resisted drawing the conclusion that crime was at issue when
they were still thinking about Caucasian male faces. African-
Americans are not just more closely associated with crime in
the eyes of their Caucasian counterparts, and therefore at risk
of receiving higher sentences; being Caucasian provides a
bonus or advantage, so that the imposition of a Caucasian
defendant will cause the decision maker to avoid the conclu-
sion that crime is at issue. By extension, it will require less
information or evidence for a judge or jury to conclude that
an African-American person is related to alleged criminal
activity. The burden of proof is higher for a Caucasian defen-
dant under this theory and the burden of proof is lower for
African-Americans. 
WEAPONS IDENTIFICATION TEST 
In another experiment, the participants were required to
engage in a quick-reaction, computerized test to quickly and
accurately identify pictures of both construction-related tools
and guns—the Weapons Identification Task (WIT). The par-
ticipants were primed with a picture of either an African-
American or a Caucasian male face. The picture of the face
would flash on the screen and would be immediately followed
by a picture of a tool or a gun. The participants would then be
required to quickly press a pre-assigned keyboard key to indi-
cate whether they had seen a gun or a tool. If they took too
long to identify the gun or tool, the screen would post a mes-
sage saying they had run out of time for that particular iden-
tification. Just as with the Race IAT, the computer recorded
the number of errors that the participant made and the
amount of time in milliseconds that it took the participant to
respond after each picture of the gun or the tool was flashed
onto the screen. Participants were required to identify over
100 pictures during the exercise. 
The researchers found overwhelmingly that participants
were more likely to mistake the tool for a gun immediately
after they saw the picture of an African-American face flashed
on the screen. They also found that the participants were
more likely to mistake a gun for a tool immediately after they
saw the picture of a Caucasian face flashed on the screen. 
Additionally, the researchers found that the responses
were differentially delayed. Participants took longer to iden-
tify the pictures of tools when they followed an African-
American face than when they followed a Caucasian face.
Additionally, participants took longer to identify the picture
of a gun when it was followed by a Caucasian face than when
it followed an African-American face. The researchers con-
cluded that the pictures of the African-American faces facili-
tated the responses to guns and interfered with the responses
to tools. 
These studies have disturbing implications for the criminal
justice system. If finders of fact more quickly and easily ana-
lyze, recognize, and associate images of crime objects when
primed with faces of African-Americans than with
Caucasians, the association of crime objects as evidence to
certain defendants may occur with greater ease as well.
Moreover, if viewing a Caucasian face diminishes a person’s
ability to see, recognize, and associate crime objects, being
Caucasian affords an impermissible advantage. 
If a judge sees a defendant as closely linked with crime
regardless of the facts of the case, regardless of the indications
that he can be rehabilitated, the judge might be less likely to
apply rehabilitation as a potential solution to criminal behav-
ior. A defendant who is endemically criminal cannot be easily








quickly . . . .
58 Court Review - Volume 49 
50. Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, & Bernd
Wittenbrink, The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314 (2002).
51. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(B) (1984).
52. Isaac Ehrlich, On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An
Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation and Deterrence,
71 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1981).
defendant. Therefore, the use of rehabilitation as a counter-
balance to the length of incapacitation would be folly. 
SHOOT NO-SHOOT TEST
In addition to assessing endemic criminal behavior, the
rehabilitation analysis is also closely aligned with the assess-
ment of threat. The prior discussion of threat assessment and
its neurophysiologic correlates reveals a striking racial dispar-
ity. A recent study reveals how racial bias concurrently affects
threat assessment and conclusions that African-Americans are
endemically criminal. 
In the Shoot No-Shoot test, conducted at the University of
Chicago, pictures of African-American and Caucasian men in
various poses are flashed on the computer screen.50 In each
picture, the person depicted is holding either a gun, a cell
phone, or a soda can. The test subjects, or “players,” must as
quickly as possible press a key on the computer keyboard to
indicate that they will either “shoot” or “not shoot” the man
in the picture. They are directed to hit the designated key-
board key to “shoot” if they believe that the man has a gun, or
to hit the key for “no shoot” if they believe that the man in the
picture has a soda can or a cell phone. As with the other reac-
tion-time-measure tests mentioned in previous studies, the
computer measures the length of time it takes the player to
respond in milliseconds and records the number of errors. 
Previous studies have repeatedly found that the over-
whelming majority of players take longer to determine that
the African-American man is holding a soda can or a cell
phone than it takes them to make the same determination for
the Caucasian man. Likewise, the overwhelming majority of
players will make more mistakes and “shoot” the African-
American man when he is not holding a gun than they will
when deciding to shoot or not shoot the Caucasian man. 
While the other studies demonstrated that the Caucasian
participants showed a stronger association between crime,
threat, or fear and African-Americans, this study demonstrates
that that association led to differential action. The subjects in
this study were required to make a choice that, while simu-
lated, served as a protective measure in response to a potential
or perceived threat. Arresting, charging, convicting, and sen-
tencing individuals are all protective measures taken in
response to potential or perceived threats. If associations
cause people to take more severe protective measures, those
concerned with fairness must become increasingly concerned
about whether there is differential application of the laws to
African-Americans in the criminal justice system. 
DETERRENCE 
In setting prison sentences, a judge must determine how
long each defendant would need to be in prison to deter him
from future criminal behavior. The United States Code states
that a judge “shall consider” in determining a sentence how
the sentence will “afford ade-
quate deterrence to criminal
conduct.”51
Numerous economists have
treated a judge’s decision-mak-
ing process on deterrence as a
calculation that involves the
weighing of factors and setting
of values.52 A judge will likely
take into account whether or
not a defendant will be par-
tially deterred by the defen-
dant’s own ethical considera-
tions, his remorse for the injury he has caused, and his dis-
comfort in a prison setting. Ethical considerations, remorse for
injuring another being (regardless of the potential recourse),
and the ability to reason in advance to avoid repercussions are
primarily human attributes. Conversely, if a judge were seeking
to deter a household pet from rule breaking, he would decide
that the pet’s ethical considerations and remorse for rule break-
ing were minimal and the pet’s ability to reason through reper-
cussions would be based on the judge repeatedly punishing the
pet in the past. This is not to equate any defendant with a pet.
Rather the example is designed to demonstrate the extremes of
human encoding.  In practice human encoding occurs on a con-
tinuum as opposed a binary state. To make these determina-
tions about a defendant in a criminal case, a judge must create
a neurophysiologic reaction in his own brain to encode the
defendant as more or less human. The judge also must activate
the neural substrates that come online when predicting the
behavior and assessing the social values of individuals.
Therefore, to determine the necessary level of deterrence and
set the proper length of a prison sentence accordingly, the judge
must activate the neurophysiologic process in earnest for
encoding humanness and assessing values. Herein lies the prob-
lem. The activation of the encoding process may occur in sig-
nificantly different ways based on the defendant’s attributes.
And the activation of the neural substrates will occur differently
if the judge sees the defendant as similarly situated to himself. 
The assessment of the necessary level of deterrence is based
upon a series of determinations. In an ordered society, the pre-
sumption is that most actors will engage in a rational thought
process when faced with a choice of committing a crime or not,
and that they will ultimately arrive at the decision to comply
with the law and avoid causing injury to others. This internal
mechanism, in conjunction with the concern that a criminal
penalty will be imposed, prevents most people, most of the
time, from engaging in criminal activity. Additionally, current
sentencing law assumes that criminal or deviant acts guided by
an “end/means calculation” will be dictated by the value system
of the actor. Before the actor commits a crime, he has identified
a potential benefit or pleasure to be derived from engaging in a
[T]he activation 
of the neural 
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criminal act. Even if the actor
seems to commit the crime
with very little prior analysis,
he has at least quickly consid-
ered the basic outlines of the
potential benefits or reward for
engaging in the criminal act.
Even if he decides quickly, he
will compare the cost or pain
that may result from the act to
the potential benefit. This
analysis will prevent the actor
from proceeding or it will inspire the actor to proceed. 
The guilt from causing another person injury or pain will
serve as a cost to the person who is able to feel for other human
beings and to empathize when seeing others in pain. The more
he is able tap into this feeling of human empathy, the greater
the cost of injuring another person. It is this sense of empathy,
the caring for others, the guilt at injuring a stranger, that some
philosophers and theologians claim makes us human and sets
us aside from others in the animal kingdom.
If the actor does not conclude that causing pain to others is a
significant cost, it may be that the actor does not feel pain or suf-
fer emotional detriment when hurting others. Moreover, if the
actor derives pleasure from causing pain, the process of hurting
another person through violence or the taking of property will
be seen as a benefit and will skew the calculation significantly. 
If the apprehension against engaging in criminal behavior
is not internally derived through sufficient moral character,
empathy, or “humanness,” the motivation must be derived
externally. The possibility of apprehension and punishment or
retribution for engaging in acts that cause others pain will
mitigate against the benefit as perceived by the actor.
However, the more deviant the actor’s analysis of benefit (i.e.,
the more he derives pleasure from pain or, conversely, the less
he derives pain or perceives cost when he injures others), the
greater the punishment required to tip the scales against
engaging in criminal behavior. If internal motivation or deter-
rence (i.e., morality or human empathy) to avoid criminal
behavior is low, then the level of external motivation or deter-
rence (i.e., the sentence) must necessarily be higher.
Therefore, it will take a more severe sentence to balance the
decision-making process of a person with low internal moti-
vation or reduced “human empathy.”
When a judge is determining an appropriate sentence, the
analysis regarding the internal and external motivations of a
defendant must be considered. The lower the internal motiva-
tion to avoid criminal activity, the more dangerous the individ-
ual may be, or, minimally, the more likely the individual may be
to engage in future criminal activity. So the object of increased
punishment is to increase external deterrence for those without
the requisite “humanness,” “ethical proclivities,” or “moral
commitments” to achieve sufficient internal deterrence.53
The conundrum for a judge is whether or not there are hid-
den factors in the judge’s decision-making process, motivating
the judge to increase the sentences for some individuals but
not others. If a judge presumes that some defendants that
come before his court are less able to engage in internal deter-
rence, the defendant may receive a higher penalty to achieve
the balance in the actor’s cost-benefit analysis. However, if
that assessment of “humanness,” “ethical proclivities,” or
“moral commitment” is based on factors outside of the evi-
dence presented in court, the sentencing process falls outside
of the bounds of law. 
UNCONSCIOUS DEHUMANIZATION OF
MARGINALIZED GROUPS 
In a study conducted at Princeton University, participants
were required to make judgments about people whom they
had not met previously but who were described as having par-
ticular attributes. As the participants made the judgments
about each person, their brains were scanned using fMRI.
There were three people described: 1) a person who was
socioeconomically disadvantaged (i.e., homeless people); 2)
an IV-drug user; and 3) a person who was not addicted to
drugs and who was presumably middle class.54 While making
the judgments, the participants used a distinctly different part
of their neuro-anatomy for the stigmatized groups (i.e., IV-
drug users and homeless people) than for the non-stigmatized
groups. The participants specifically failed to use the portion
of the brain, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) that is nec-
essary for encoding individuals as social beings.55 If we fail to
use the mPFC to consider and judge individuals, we have
effectively dehumanized them. The mPFC allows us to
process exclusively human emotions for others, such as pity
and pride.56 If we are not activating our mPFC when consid-
ering certain individuals from particular social categories, we
are not feeling exclusively human emotions such as pity or
pride for them.57
This process of dehumanizing “others” is likely more pro-
The conundrum
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nounced when the otherness is based on race and, undoubt-
edly, potentiated when race and socioeconomic factors are
combined. Socioeconomically disadvantaged defendants may
be relegated to the realm of “other” by those who have
achieved privilege, which may indeed include judges.
However, the combination of socioeconomic disadvantage
and marginalized racial identity, such as with African-
Americans, would likely create an even more stark result. This
increase level of dehumanization is based upon the specific
animal association held in the unconscious minds of many in
the United States. 
A study from Stanford University demonstrated that many
Caucasians in the United States more closely associate
African-Americans with apes than they do with their
Caucasian counterparts. In their study, participants were
primed with either a picture of an African-American male or
a Caucasian male (a third control group received no priming
images).58 The participants were then shown blurred images
of various animals, including peacocks and apes. The initial
frame was so blurry that it could not be identified, but with
each advancing frame, the object became more distinct.
When the image reached the 32nd frame, it was completely
identifiable. However, most people were able to identify each
of the animals by the 16th frame. But there was a significant
difference in how quickly participants could identify the
apes, versus the other animals, based upon the priming
mechanism used. 
Participants primed with the African-American face were
able to correctly identify the picture of the ape more quickly
than the other animals. Participants primed with the
Caucasian face, and those who were not primed, were not able
to identify the ape earlier than any of the other animals. 
The association between African-Americans and apes has
been advanced repeatedly in both overt and subtle ways.
There is a long history of the association being used to justify
the oppression and increased punishment of African-
Americans, immigrants, and Jewish people during the
Holocaust.59 Historically, those who are stigmatized as less
than human often receive a less rigorous application of moral
considerations and rules.60
If African-Americans are more closely associated with apes
than are their Caucasian counterparts, African-Americans are
seen as more closely linked with the key aspects of apes as
compared to humans. African-Americans are seen by many,
whether or not they realize it, to be less able to control
impulses, more likely to engage in violent behavior, and lack-
ing a fully functional internal
moral code. 
While increased hostility
increases the motivation to
impose a more severe sentence,
and thus ensure greater retribu-
tion, decreased humanity exacer-
bates this effect. More severe ret-
ribution can be imposed when the
decision maker does not socially categorize a defendant as
human. If a judge cannot activate the mPFC effectively to
apply exclusive human emotions to a defendant, extenuating
or mitigating circumstances for the act may not be factored
into a sentencing decision. Additionally, if a judge sees a
defendant as less than human, the judge may be unable to
activate the mPFC to apply the principle of rehabilitation.
Programs that allow for reintegration into society, therapeutic
options, or community support may be seen by a judge as
inapplicable to someone without the requisite human attrib-
utes to be capable of being rehabilitated. If a judge’s neuro-
physiologic reaction to an African-American defendant is one
of fear, threat, and distrust, then the sentencing principle of
incapacitation becomes ever-more important as the judge
determines the length of the sentence. Additionally, the strong
association between African-American faces and crime objects
will solidify the conclusion that the defendant is a criminal
and belongs in prison. A less-than-human, threatening, untrust-
worthy defendant who is automatically associated with negative
concepts and crime cannot be easily deterred from committing
crimes in the future. And a defendant who engenderers increased
hostility in a judge is at a distinct disadvantage throughout a
criminal trial and at the time of sentencing. More severe penal-
ties may be imposed to ensure that someone without the req-
uisite internal motivation and with the proclivity to engage in
criminal behavior does not offend again. The end result—
African-Americans, all other factors being equal, would likely
receive longer sentences than their Caucasian counterparts
due to the neurophysiologic reactions related to implicit
biases in the mind of a judge. 
Of course, evidence that demonstrates innocence or the
presence of factors that may mitigate against a severe sentence
would presumably override bias in the courtroom. However, if
executive functioning is diminished, the decision maker’s
ability to “think past” the biases may be impaired. It may take
more evidence to counter the negative associations. The






Court Review - Volume 49 61
evidence, and more reliable evidence, than his Caucasian
counterpart to be acquitted or to receive a similar sentence for
the same crime. Such an outcome would be abhorrent in the
eyes of the justice system. Consequently, while many judges
will admit that implicit bias exists and that they may hold cer-
tain biases, they remain convinced that their thoughtful and
rigorous process of decision making as well as the application
of the evidence rules and the penal code will minimize the
effects of the bias. 
CONCLUSION
Simply saying that neurophysiologic processes implicated
in bias affects criminal sentencing is a gross over-simplifica-
tion. Instead we must recognize that there are multiple aspects
of decision making that increase the level of bias in legal
analysis. These aspects potentiate the assessment of fear,
threat, and aversion; increase the level of aggression; decrease
pain empathy for African-Americans and encoding of African-
Americans as human; and decrease the use of portions of the
brain that use information other than bias to reach conclu-
sions about individuals. Understanding the complexity of the
forces affecting judges as they hand down sentences allows
the policy-makers to devise more effective solutions.
Assuming that judges can simply try harder to be fair, take
more time when making decisions, or utilize their egalitarian
value systems to eliminate bias in their decision-making
process is naïve. The solutions should be tailored to the neu-
rophysiologic reactions and the psychological processes that
infuse bias into the sentencing decisions. As judges and legis-
lators across the country become more amenable to change,
these solutions will be instituted. However, acceptance of the
implicit bias, the neuro-scientific correlates, and their role in
the sentencing process is the first step. 
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